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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Dollarized economies have experienced in recent years a number of severe banking and 
currency crises in which runs on bank deposits, mainly dollar deposits, have played a major 
role.
2 The recent Argentinean currency and financial crisis and its tidal waves throughout the 
region, notably in Uruguay and Paraguay, has brought home the realization that dollarization 
can greatly complicate crisis management and create major financial vulnerabilities.
3  
 
While the issue of ascertaining whether these crises were self-fulfilling or driven by 
deteriorating fundamentals is outside the scope of this paper, it is clear that systemic runs in 
dollarized economies have an important self-fulfilling component.
4 On the one hand, dollar 
deposits can only be paid off to the extent banks have sufficient dollar liquidity or sufficient 
access (through lender of last resort, or LOLR, arrangements) to dollar liquidity on-lent by 
the central bank. In a highly dollarized fractional reserve banking system, only a limited 
proportion of bank deposits can be backed this way. At the same time, many factors 
exacerbate the run, once it is under way. In addition to incurring potential losses through the 
firesale of bank assets, depositors that are left in the banks face the threat of last resort 
measures designed to stop the run, including deposit freezes.  
 
The rationale for running is even more compelling in a mixed-currency economy than in a 
peso economy or a fully dollarized economy, as threats loom of forced conversions into 
pesos, large exchange rate depreciations, or some combination of the two (as in the midst of 
the Argentine crisis of 2002). The exchange rate is typically floated to stem runs on peso 
deposits—including after a forced conversion that broadens the peso deposit base—or to 
limit the loss of international reserves—including after banks are given LOLR support in 
pesos to meet dollar deposit withdrawals. While freeing the exchange rate can be a lifeline 
for the pesos (the resulting overshooting helps maintain them within the economy, if not 
                                                 
2 While recent deposit runs in highly dollarized countries have affected both peso and dollar 
deposits, the magnitude of dollar runs was substantially larger (both in absolute magnitude 
and as a proportion of initial deposits), reflecting in part the fact that peso deposits are largely 
transactional (see Gulde et al., 2004, and Ingves and Moretti, 2003).    
3 Such events are scarcely new. The Argentine crisis was itself to a large extent a repeat of 
the much earlier but quite similar “mex-dollar” crisis in Mexico (see Ize and Ortiz, 1986). 
4 The notion that self-fulfilling liquidity runs are the main drivers of systemic financial crises 
has gained advocates in academic and policy quarters. According to this view, increases in 
perceived rollover risk that trigger interest rate hikes or outright rationing in capital markets 
may precipitate a default—even in the absence of solvency problems. This multiple-
equilibrium argument, rooted in Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model of self-fulfilling bank 
runs, has been highlighted for the case of sovereign debt by Calvo (1988) and, more recently, 
Cole and Kehoe (1998).   - 4 - 
 
within the banking system), it can be the “nail in the coffin” for the dollars.
5 Indeed, it is 
likely to further deteriorate the quality of dollar loans, thereby worsening banks’ financial 
position and amplifying potential losses to depositors.
6 Expectations of such events therefore 
add fuel to the run, both on pesos and dollars, and enhance the probability that they will 
actually materialize.  
 
This paper deals with three basic issues at the core of systemic liquidity risk management in 
dollarized economies. First, in the absence of better alternatives, supervisory authorities in 
most financially dollarized countries have shown a distinct preference for dollar liquidity, in 
the form of a large stock of international reserves and/or substantial liquid foreign asset 
requirements (LARs) on dollar deposits. However, large liquidity buffers are expensive in 
countries where country risk premia are high (which is typically the case in highly dollarized 
countries). Thus, most observers would agree that some form of insurance arrangement, such 
that commercial banks (or the central bank) can obtain automatic access to an external credit 
line in times of need, should in principle be welfare improving. However, the experience thus 
far with such arrangements has not been very successful. The paper discusses why and 
argues that the difficulties met so far are unlikely to go away in the foreseeable future. 
 
Second, the paper discusses whether the liquidity buffer should be held in a centralized or 
decentralized manner, a question that has been barely addressed in the literature. With the 
help of a stylized example, we show that, in the absence of LARs, centralizing reserves at the 
central bank introduces an agency cost leading to suboptimal dollar liquidity holdings and an 
implicit subsidy to dollar intermediation. By contrast, decentralized holdings (through the 
imposition of LARs) help internalize the externalities of currency risk, at the cost of forgoing 
the potential diversification benefits of a common liquidity fund. In the context of largely 
systemic shocks, we conclude that the cost of the latter strategy is outweighed by its benefits: 
a positive LAR (and one greater than the one corresponding to peso deposits) is indeed 
optimal from a prudential perspective. However, we also argue that, once LARs have been 
introduced, it can make sense to put in place a limited dollar liquidity recycling facility 
designed to address idiosyncratic liquidity risk and further increase the resilience of the 
banking system.    
 
Unless LARs are set at an extremely high level, resulting in a prohibitive cost, there will 
always be a remnant probability that the run will exhaust the available liquidity.
7 The 
                                                 
5 The link between currency and banking crises has been analyzed, among many others, by 
Goldfajn and Valdés (1997) and Chang and Velasco (1998), and documented empirically by 
Kaminski and Reinhart (2002). 
6 See Levy Yeyati, Martínez Pería, and Schmukler (2004). 
7 Indeed, the very presence of dollar liquidity in the banking sector may fuel the run, much in 
the same way stressed by Zettelmeyer (2000) for capital outflows in the presence of 
(inadequately small) international rescue packages.   - 5 - 
 
question then is whether there are ways to economize on the use of reserves and stop the run 
in ways that are less traumatic than the last-resort measures cited above. The last section of 
the paper proposes a scheme that supplements the LAR with the concept of “circuit breaker” 
(CBR), i.e., a temporary, efficient, and pre-programmed suspension of convertibility. The 
proposal combines the use of limited dollar liquidity earmarked to ensure the full 
convertibility of transactional dollar deposits with a mechanism that automatically 
reprograms dollar-term deposits once triggered by a sufficient decline in banks’ liquidity. We 
conclude that the CBR, if well designed and accompanied by adequate prudential policies 
(including as regards bank resolution), could both limit the need for (hence the cost of) a 
dollar liquidity buffer and narrow the scope for destabilizing runs on the banking system. We 
also suggest that a system with CBR-like properties could be de facto introduced without 
actually referring explicitly in the legal framework to the possible need for restructuring bank 
deposits in the event of systemic crises.  
 
Section II reviews recent experiences with liquidity insurance. Section III argues in favor of 
LARs. Section IV presents the case for circuit breakers. Section V concludes.   
 
II.   CAN LIQUIDITY BE BORROWED? 
A.   Self-Insurance versus External Insurance 
There are two ways in which a dollarized financial system can insure itself against a dollar 
liquidity shortage: 
•  Self-insurance, through the holding of a substantial stock of foreign-currency-
denominated liquid assets, either by the central bank, or by individual banks. 
•  External insurance, through a contract with private providers of dollar liquidity 
(typically, a consortium of financial institutions) or, alternatively, with international 
financial institutions (IFIs) that ensures financial institutions access to dollar liquidity 
at a reasonable cost.
8  
Whether the liquidity buffer is held by the central bank or by commercial banks, self-
insurance entails a non-trivial cost (namely, the cost that the government or the financial 
institutions have to pay in excess of the return on liquid foreign assets to finance the purchase 
of the reserves), which combines a maturity and a sovereign risk premia. A back-of-the-
envelope calculation would estimate this cost as the difference between the average yield of 
                                                 
8 The concept has obvious similarities with the definition of a standard insurance contract, 
under which the insurer promises to transfer to the insured party, contingent on the 
realization of a well-defined event, a pre-specified amount, typically proportional with the 
losses associated with the event. Indeed, liquidity insurance can be understood as interest rate 
insurance, whereby the insurer promises to lend at a pre-specified rate.   - 6 - 
 
external debt (as measured, e.g., by J.P. Morgan’s EMBI index) and the return on central 
bank reserves, a non-negligible number for most emerging economies.
9  
 
Should liquidity runs be purely self-fulfilling, an external insurance would thus clearly be 
less expensive than holding the liquidity. Indeed, as the literature on bank runs clearly 
illustrates, the likelihood of a self-fulfilling run is endogenous to the presence (and amount) 
of insurance: ultimately, a perfectly insured country should be immune to a non-fundamental 
liquidity run. Thus, an external insurer facing zero risk could offer full insurance (namely, a 
contract providing the threshold level of reserves as needed) at zero cost.
 10  
 
In practice, however, things are more complicated. First, the size of the insurance package 
that would be needed to fully insure a banking system (e.g., to fully insure against self-
fulfilling runs and eliminate risk) is typically quite large, and the risk associated with it 
difficult to diversify. Second, and perhaps more important, since liquidity insurance is based 
on a loan rather than a straight transfer (where no repayment is expected from the insured 
party), the solvency of the insured party is a precondition for the sustainability of the scheme. 
Yet, runs are often driven by fundamentals, hence accompanied by expectations of losses. 
Third, the fact that the insurable event (e.g., a liquidity run) and the associated losses (e.g., 
the decline in the value of the banks’ assets) are hard to define in a verifiable way, provides 
fertile grounds for moral hazard.  
 
Thus, insurance premia are likely to be prohibitively expensive unless the facility is 
collateralized.
11 However, the availability of collateral in the case of emerging economies is 
                                                 
9 The country risk premium may overstate the marginal borrowing cost, to the extent that 
reserve holdings contribute to lowering the sovereign risk premium paid on the full stock of 
debt. However, country risk may also understate the marginal cost if the country faces an 
upward-sloping supply of funds. Ultimately, the effect of netting out debt and reserves (for 
example, through a debt buyback) will likely depend on the liquidity needs of the country 
and cannot be signed unambiguously. 
10 The argument is made by Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2005) to propose that IFIs provide an 
uncontingent country insurance facility to cope with non-fundamental, self-fulfilling liquidity 
runs. It has to be noted, however, that if all risk were non-fundamental, a sufficiently large 
stock of reserves would eliminate the sovereign risk premium, reducing the cost of carrying 
reserves to the maturity premium. 
11 In most private insurance contracts, the insurer charges up front a premium proportional to 
the expected transfer. Similarly, a liquidity insurance contract would require a premium to 
compensate the insurer for the lower rate charged in case the policy is activated—and a 
commitment fee would be charged to compensate the insurer for the liquidity premium 
associated with the provision of funds on short notice. This premium would typically be 
minor, particularly in the case of a pure liquidity run where the repayment capacity of the 
(continued…)   - 7 - 
 
generally limited and of dubious collateral value. Faced with poor collateral, insurers are thus 
likely to use any means they have to limit their downside exposure as the level of risk rises, 
thereby limiting the benefits of the insurance. Indeed, this is what happened in the two recent 
examples of large private insurance arrangements. 
 
B.   Private Insurance 
The closest recent experiment of privately funded liquidity insurance was the contingent 
credit line subscribed between the Argentine central bank and a consortium of foreign banks 
in the late 1990s, whereby the central bank—as well as participating local banks—had the 
option to engage in a repurchase agreement against Argentine sovereign securities for up to 
US$6.7 billion (see Box 1). However, the coverage of this contract was relatively limited; its 
execution was delayed until August 2001, when the liquidity run was well underway; and it 
was executed only in connection with an agreement with the IMF that prompted up the price 
of bonds, albeit momentarily. All in all, the contract ultimately provided a meager US$1.77 
billion (out of US$4.75 billion available at the beginning of 2001). Moreover, due to the 
ongoing liquidity run, the decline in the price of the bonds used as collateral implied a 
reduction in the size of the line, which dropped to US$1.35 billion at the first three-month 
renewal, thus generating a financing gap for the difference—exactly the opposite effect as the 
one that motivated the contract in the first place.
12 
 
A second related experience with this type of private liquidity insurance contract is provided 
by Mexico (see Box 2). The line was withdrawn in its entirety by the Mexican government 
on September 30, 1998, prompted by a deterioration of access to the international capital 
markets coupled with a decline in oil prices that reduced fiscal resources. However, as was to 
be the case later on in Argentina, insuring banks contested the decision of the government to 
use these resources, on grounds that current external conditions did not warrant the execution 
of the contract. Although they finally conceded to extend the loan, they subsequently refused 
                                                                                                                                                       
insured party is not at stake. However, liquidity and solvency risk are difficult to disentangle, 
complicating the computation of a fair premium. 
 
12 Many reasons prevented the issuance of additional collateral at the time. Besides budgetary 
constraints on the amount of debt to be issued, there were legal restrictions as the covenants 
stated in some detail the bonds that could be included in the deal, and many of those could 
not be reopened. More important, issuing bonds in private markets was not an option in the 
middle of the run—the very reason why liquidity insurance was needed. One alternative 
would have been to endow the central bank with additional bonds at the time of negotiating 




Box 1. The Argentine Contingent Credit Line 
 
Under this contract, the central bank was allowed to withdraw, in the event of a crisis, from a 
credit line in exchange for dollar-denominated government bonds. The maturity of the contract 
was three years, with an ever-greening clause such that, every three months, the life of the 
program was extended a further three months (the high frequency of this revision clause, while 
it helped to reduce the commitment fee, ultimately proved to be a severe drawback of the 
scheme). Argentine dollar-denominated bonds were taken at 80 percent of their market value 
(if the price of the bonds fell by more than 5 percent, further bonds had to be delivered as 
margin). 
 
The contract stipulated an annual commitment fee of 32 basis points (bps), plus an interest rate 
on withdrawn funds of roughly LIBOR plus 205 basis points. The insurance cost was certainly 
small compared to that of holding reserves (for illustrative purposes, the average government 
bond yield in 1998, by the time the contract was in place, was around 940 bps). Using the 
spread over the average return on reserves reported by the central bank for the same year as a 
proxy for the cost of carry of additional reserves, increasing the stock by the amount committed 
under the contract would have entailed a “fee” cost of about 570 bps (alternatively, a flow cost 








Box 2. The Mexican Contingent Credit Line 
 
In November 1997, the Mexican government subscribed a contingent credit line with 31 major 
private international financial institutions, at the time when the contagion effects from the 
Asian crises started to be felt in emerging markets. The facility would provide the government 
with sufficient resources to meet the external debt service in the event of a closure of the 
country’s access to international capital markets. Specifically, it made available US$2.5 billion 
(later extended to US$2.66 billion with the addition of two new institutions) for up to 18 
months, at a rate equal to 3M LIBOR plus 50 bps during the first semester (increasing by       
25 bps each subsequent semester), at the cost of an annual commitment fee of 30 bps (or, 






to renew the contract. While it is difficult to attribute this controversy to one single cause, a 
balanced judgment would point to a combination of two factors: the difficulty in defining 
unambiguously the event that triggers the contingency clause, and the reluctance of the 
insurer to assume the costs of the contract. At any rate, the contract proved to be subject to 
controversial interpretations that may detract from its timeliness and effectiveness. 
Thus, the appeal of this type of solution appears to be (as it was in the Argentine case) 
subject to important caveats. The first one is related to the fact that, in this case, the insurer   - 9 - 
 
actually has a stake in the value of the country and might want to hedge part of this risk.  
More precisely, insurer banks, faced with a mounting probability of a crisis that triggers the 
insurance policy, may have incentives to hedge their growing exposure by shorting the 
country’s assets, accelerating the collapse. The same is valid if liquidity insurance is 
triggered by a currency run: growing exchange rate pressure would lead insurers to short the 
domestic currency, deepening the currency crisis.
13 
 
The second shortcoming is associated with size. If this type of contracts extends to several 
emerging markets, the scope for the insurer to diversify risks than are highly correlated 
within the region narrows, hence limiting the size of the coverage. Thus, inasmuch as 
currency attacks have a common pattern across insured countries, there will be a limit to the 
coverage that private international institutions may be willing to extend. 
 
The third obstacle to private insurance is the flipside of the previous one, namely, the risk 
that insurers, lured by juicy commissions, take on more risk than they can reasonably handle. 
Note that this could lead to what amounts to a reverse moral hazard problem, as banks may 
become reluctant to provide the committed resources once the crisis is underway.  
 
In sum, these two experiences seem to indicate that private insurance, while possibly useful 
as a partial complement to other mechanisms, is not a promising alternative for countrywide 
coverage of systemic liquidity risk. 
 
C.   Public Insurance 
Some of the main drawbacks of private insurance (particularly moral hazard and the need for 
hedging) can be overcome by contracting insurance from nonprofit official organizations 
(such as IFIs) or other regional financial arrangements (such as the Asian Chiang Mai 
initiative). In the case of the IMF, while this is an issue that goes much beyond the scope of 
this paper, it will suffice here to note that IMF-led packages have so far provided liquidity 
insurance only imperfectly and reluctantly, and with the broader objective of stabilizing the 
capital account, which goes beyond the more specific one of assisting local banks. Moreover, 
difficulties in isolating liquidity from solvency concerns have hampered the scope for a 
smooth and timely provision of liquidity support. Thus, the recent IMF’s contingent credit 
line (CCL) initiative, the closest to a liquidity insurance scheme ever launched by an IFI, 
required a somewhat discretionary pre-qualification process at the request of the countries. 
Combined with its limited size, this reduced its potential attractiveness. As a result, it was 
never requested and was ultimately phased out.  
 
                                                 
13 On this, see Broda and Levy Yeyati (2003a). Note that individual institutions, by hedging, 
would increase their exposure through the insurance policy. However, they are likely to do so 
to the extent that the negative impact of reducing their position on the country is diluted in 
the aggregate, while the benefits of hedging accrue entirely to them. In addition, the margin 
call should also add to this negative feedback effect.   - 10 - 
 
D.   Taking Stock 
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn from this brief overview. First, it is clear that 
private liquidity insurance is bound to be limited and, possibly, unreliable in the event of a 
substantive shock, both because of the capacity of the insurer to transfer back the risk to the 
insured party, and because the limited scope for diversification of country risk may 
compromise the profitability and solvency of the insurer as the size of the contract 
increases.
14 Second, while the role of IFIs as country insurers certainly deserves rigorous 
consideration, it is realistic to assume that no ad hoc country insurance facility will be 
launched in the near future. 
 
This leaves the country with the self-insurance option as the more realistic and reliable (albeit 
costly) option. In the case of a liquidity run on the banking sector, this option can take 
essentially two forms: liquid assets requirements (LARs) on dollar deposits, or the 
accumulation of central bank reserves. To the analysis of these options we now turn. 
 
III.   THE CASE FOR LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
A.   Background 
Reflecting the difficulties of contracting external insurance, most financially dollarized 
economies—particularly those hit by recent currency runs—have exhibited a preference for 
self-insuring through large international reserve buffers. This has been the case, irrespective 
of the exchange regime (see Table 1).
15  
 
The accumulation of international liquidity can take different forms, however, depending on 
who is the owner of the liquidity. In the traditional (and most frequently encountered) form, 
the central bank centralizes most of this liquidity by subjecting commercial banks to reserve 
requirements or by borrowing in the domestic debt market. It administers its use by providing 
 
 
                                                 
14 There have also been recent proposals to use non-emerging market specific assets, such as 
options on the S&P volatility index, as a hedge against sudden stop-induced liquidity crises 
(see Caballero and Panageas, 2005). However, it is questionable whether the depth of such 
markets is sufficient to provide broad-based insurance at accessible prices. Moreover, even if 
there is a broad correlation between world volatility indices and the probability of bank runs 
in emerging countries, the timeliness of the hedge (a crucial condition for its effectiveness) 
cannot be ensured. 
15 Emerging economies are defined as those included in JP Morgan’s EMBI GLOBAL 
portfolio. Interestingly, the tendency to increase the stock of reserves applies also to 
economies with non-dollarized banking sectors (e.g., South East Asian countries), as they 
still have a sizable stock of foreign currency liabilities that may impinge on the repayment 
capacity of the public or corporate sector in the event of a sudden devaluation.   - 11 - 
 
Table 1. International Reserves 
(As percentage of GDP) 
 
Country 1992  2002 
Algeria               3.0  41.3 
Argentina 4.2  10.2 
Brazil 5.8 8.1 
Bulgaria              10.3  27.9 
Chile 19.8  22.0 
China,P.R.: Mainland  4.0  22.5 
Colombia 13.2  12.7 
Costa Rica            11.7  8.7 
Côte d'Ivoire         0.1  15.9 
Croatia               1.7  25.8 
Ecuador 6.6  2.8 
Egypt                 25.4  15.4 
Hungary               11.6  15.0 
India 2.0  13.5 
Indonesia             7.3  17.7 
Israel                7.7  22.8 
Jordan 14.6 42.4 
Korea 5.0 22.1 
Lebanon               26.3  41.6 
Malaysia              28.4  35.0 
Mexico 5.1  7.7 
Morocco               12.2  27.5 
Nigeria               3.4  15.9 
Pakistan 1.7  12.6 
Panama                7.3  9.5 
Peru                  7.8  16.6 
Philippines 8.1  17.2 
Poland                4.6  14.6 
Russia n.a. 12.7 
South Africa          0.8  5.3 
Thailand              18.3  30.0 
Turkey                3.7  14.5 
Ukraine 2.3  9.9 
Uruguay 3.8  6.2 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  15.4  8.5 
Average EM  8.9  18.1 
Australia             3.5  4.7 
Canada                1.6  4.4 
New Zealand           7.3  5.5 
Norway 8.7  16.1 
Switzerland           13.0  13.9 
United Kingdom        3.2  2.1 
United States  0.6  0.3 
Average Industrials  5.4  6.7 
      Sources: Reproduced from Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2005).- 12 -   
 
LOLR in domestic currency and intervening in the foreign exchange market to sterilize the 
excess liquidity, or by providing LOLR directly in foreign currency to banks incurring dollar 
deposit outflows.
16 However, the need to fend off pressures to use this stock of liquidity for 
non-intended purposes has motivated in many countries the introduction of liquid assets 
requirement (LARs) on financial institutions (as in Argentina under the currency board). In 
such cases, the contingency fund is raised and directly invested by the banks in a foreign 
account. 
 
B.   Some First Principles 
The model presented in Appendix I discusses the comparative benefits of either approach, 
illustrating two main, rather intuitive aspects.  
 
The first one highlights the fact that access to a LOLR facility, whether in pesos or in dollars, 
is a substitute for the banks’ own liquidity holdings, thereby reducing banks’ demand for 
precautionary liquidity. In the absence of LOLR, banks demand liquid reserves up to the 
point where the marginal carrying cost of the reserves equals the marginal cost of falling 
short of reserves, times the probability of facing such a shortage. By contrast, with a LOLR, 
banks restrict their demand such that the marginal carrying cost of the reserves equals the 
marginal cost of borrowing from the LOLR facility, times the probability of falling short. 
Since in the relevant case, the cost of borrowing must be below the cost of falling short, it 
follows that banks demand less reserves in the presence of a LOLR.
17 Specifically, they 
restrict the use of their own reserves to the smaller, most likely shocks, and rely on the 
central bank’s LOLR to cover the larger, less likely shocks. 
 
The second aspect stressed by the model is the fundamental asymmetry regarding the cost to 
the central bank of providing a peso LOLR versus a dollar LOLR. In the first case, the LOLR 
can be offered at virtually no cost through the issuance of peso monetary liabilities. Indeed, 
even if the provision of liquidity is fully sterilized, the risk-adjusted rate it receives on its 
loans would be typically higher than the rate it pays on its bonds, so that a peso LOLR could 
be regarded as a profitable activity. More important, it is also socially desirable because it 
makes banks more resilient to runs, hence less exposed to costly liquidations.
18 Instead, a 
                                                 
16 A minor variation on the same idea is a fiscally budgeted contingency fund (as in Hong 
Kong) by which the government (as opposed to the central bank) can act as a lender of last 
resort. 
17 Note that, if the borrowing cost exceeds the cost of the shortage (associated, e.g., to the fire 
sale of assets), banks would never use the LOLR facility, which would therefore become 
irrelevant. 
18 The central bank intermediates between depositors and banks following a general loss of 
confidence in the same way it steps into the interbank market to intermediate between banks 
(continued…) - 13 -   
 
peso central bank can only provide dollar LOLR to the extent that it holds dollar reserves. 
However, the carrying cost of dollar reserves exceeds the expected revenue from their use in 
LOLR. Indeed, should this not be the case, commercial banks would be better off holding 
their own reserves rather than borrowing them (at a penalty rate) from the central bank. Thus, 
a dollar LOLR is costly to a central bank.
19 At the same time, what constitutes a cost to the 
central bank becomes a subsidy for commercial banks—at the expense of the representative 
taxpayer. Thus, the dollar LOLR limits the risk of dollar deposits and lowers their cost, 
thereby promoting excessive dollar intermediation. 
 
A corollary of the model is that, in much the same way as any other unfairly priced insurance 
scheme, the dollar LOLR facility subsidizes—in addition to currency risk—risk-taking in 
general. Because aggressive banks discount the future more highly (that is, they anticipate 
that they may no longer be solvent at the time a run on their deposits occurs), they hold less 
precautionary reserves and rely more on the LOLR facility. At the same time, if central bank 
reserves are limited and rationed among all banks, conservative banks increase their reserve 
holdings to avoid being rationed. It follows that, the central bank's reserves, when binding, 
will largely be used to support risky banks. In turn, by holding fewer reserves, risky banks 
will face lower intermediation costs than conservative banks and, hence, will be able to 
compete unfairly with conservative banks. Thus, in the limit, a reliable dollar LOLR funded 
in a large stock of liquid reserves at the central bank may lead to a more risky banking sector. 
 
C.   Policy Implications 
Eliminating the provision of dollar LOLR under systemic liquidity crises would thus be 
desirable in that it would reduce the scope for distortions and induce banks to demand levels 
of dollar liquidity that are closer to the optimum. However, a dollar LOLR plays a useful role 
in resolving idiosyncratic liquidity crises and limiting contagion risk. Due to the central 
bank's privileged position (seniority status in liquidation claims and privileged information 
on the banks' financial situation) and its capacity to overcome coordination failures (in cases 
where it is optimal for the banking system as a whole to support a bank in difficulty but no 
bank can do it in isolation), a central bank LOLR that recycles dollar liquidity from liquidity 
rich banks to liquidity poor banks can improve on the functioning of the interbank market.
20 
                                                                                                                                                       
when a particular bank cannot mobilize sufficient financing from other banks due to 
exposure limits. 
19Unless the central bank can immediately "fiscalize" this cost by shifting it to the treasury, 
this may undermine its capacity to conduct monetary policy. See Ize (2005). 
20See Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2004) for a recent review of the theoretical justification 
behind central bank LOLR. 
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At the same time, by pooling reserves centrally and recycling liquidity, a dollar LOLR can 
greatly economize on (or obviate altogether) the need for international reserves. Thus, it 
enhances the capacity of individual banks to sustain a particularly large run on their deposits, 
thereby limiting contagion risks and increasing the resiliency of the banking system as a 
whole. 
 
The distortionary impact of a dollar LOLR on the demand for bank reserves could be limited 
in principle by ensuring that its use is strictly restricted to idiosyncratic events. However, 
differentiating between purely idiosyncratic events and systemic runs is likely to be difficult 
(if not impossible) in practice. With contagion risk, idiosyncratic events can trigger systemic 
crises. At the same time, systemic factors can manifest themselves first in one or two banks. 
 
Since a dollar LOLR facility serves a useful role and its use cannot be credibly restricted, the 
preferable second-best policy is to require that all banks hold minimum liquid dollar reserves 
in proportion to their liquid dollar liabilities. Introducing LAR will ensure that: (1) banks do 
not “free ride” on the central bank's LOLR and international reserves, thereby shifting the 
cost of the liquidity buffer to the public sector and undermining the central bank's solvency; 
and (2) weaker (or riskier) banks do not unduly benefit from the LOLR facility at the expense 
of the stronger, less risky banks, thereby making the financial system more brittle and 
vulnerable. 
 
The LARs should be set such that they induce banks to hold socially optimal levels of 
liquidity. When liquidation costs are fully internalized by banks, the optimal LAR should 
match the liquidity levels banks would choose on their own in the absence of an LOLR 
facility. However, in the presence of externalities (that is, substantial additional bank 
liquidation costs that banks do not internalize), the LAR may need to be higher. To avoid any 
shift in the burden of the liquidity buffer to the public sector, the assets eligible for the LAR 
should be restricted to foreign assets that benefit from a deep, liquid market. 
 
Once LARs are introduced, the central banks' dollar LOLR can be credibly limited to 
providing exceptional additional support to isolated banks that face very large liquidity 
shocks. Official international reserves to support such operations are only needed to the 
extent that central bank obligations to the banks supplying the liquidity may need to be 




                                                 
21 If there is a market for short-term dollar treasury bills, the liquidity of that market may also 
need to be supported by a minimum backing of international reserves that allows the central 
bank to conduct repo operations against such instruments. However, the interest rate on these 
instruments should be allowed to rise under systemic crises, thereby limiting their liquidity 
and contributing to an interest rate defense by inducing other dollar rates (including on bank 
deposits) to rise. - 15 -   
 
IV.   SHOULD CIRCUIT BREAKERS BE INSTITUTIONALIZED? 
 
A.   Why Circuit Breakers? 
 
Given the cost of insurance (whether self-contracted or externally contracted), it is generally 
not optimal (or feasible) to fully back all deposits with liquid foreign assets. This raises the 
question of how to deal with too large (therefore, not optimally insurable) dollar liquidity 
runs. In this section we examine a novel mechanism that could complement LARs. What we 
have in mind is a scheme that limits in an organized and predictable way the convertibility of 
dollar deposits in the event of a pronounced run. As the scheme is intended to short-circuit 
the run at an early stage, we refer to it as a circuit breaker (CBR). 
 
In most of the recent systemic bank panics in dollarized Latin American economies,  
governments were forced to take forceful measures at some stage to stop the runs. Ecuador, 
Argentina, and Uruguay are just three recent examples of dollarized economies where such 
measures became mechanisms of last resort. They represented desperate attempts to avoid a 
full collapse of the banking system and were designed in a rush in the midst of a crisis. In 
some cases, they took the form of a freeze on part or all of the deposits in the banking 
system, in others a forced restructuring of time deposits. In a few cases, a “corralito” was 
created, which meant that depositors maintained access to their funds but only if they 
remained in the (local) banking system (see Box 3).
22 
 
However such measures (which were also in the nature of circuit breakers) were typically 
brought in at a late stage of the crisis, once the banks had exhausted their liquid reserves and 
the central banks had used a significant amount of international reserves, emulating a lender 
of last resort in the foreign currency. Moreover, their design was largely improvised at the 
spur of the moment, and their introduction implied a significant change in the rules of the 
game (including legally sanctioned contractual clauses) as they were not part of the 
regulatory framework at the time of the crises. Thus, the measures typically created large 
uncertainties at the time of their introduction, compounding those already inherent to the 
crisis. In addition, they gave rise in the months and years after the crisis to endless litigation, 
forcing some of these measures eventually to be reversed in the courts or resulting in costly 
fiscal outlays to settle the claims. 
 
Instead, a CBR could be made an integral part of the regulatory framework and tied in with 
bank resolution procedures. The explicit adoption of a system of CBRs that are clearly pre-
specified has a number of important advantages. First, it helps depositors know the rules of 
the game in advance, and limits the scope for ex-post legal action against abuses on property 
rights. Second, it puts in place the market incentives that are needed for risks to be fully 
                                                 
22 Some of the issues in this section are also discussed in Ingves and Moretti (2003), and 
Gulde et al. (2004). - 16 -   
 
  
Box 3:  Introducing CBR-Type Measures Under Crises 
 
In deposit freezes, depositors lost access to the deposits included in the freeze and did not know how 
and when they would regain access (no clear mechanism or date were provided in that regard). Nor 
did depositors know the interest rate earned by the frozen deposits during the freeze. In most cases, 
the freeze was introduced as a temporary measure until a longer-term solution could be found. 
 
Compulsory reprogrammings of selected deposits provided a preferable alternative in that depositors 
receive a new financial instrument from the bank with a known maturity, which could be securitized 
as a CD or medium-term note, to be traded in the secondary and repo markets increasing its liquidity 
for cash-strapped depositors. However, the difference between the two is ultimately moot: if the 
conditions that led to the freeze are not reverted in the short run, it should eventually evolve into a full 
reprogramming.  
 
The Argentine “corralito” (or fence) in principle had the advantage that it allowed depositors to 
maintain full access to their funds as long as they remained within the (local) banking system. Agents 
could issue checks and transfer funds between bank accounts, from one bank to another, from peso to 
dollars, and from time to sight deposits. However, they could not withdraw cash and their transfers 
abroad were restricted to commercial account transactions (capital controls were introduced). 
   
The corralito, however, had a number of crucial drawbacks. First, it did not prevent the further 
dollarization of bank deposits (as agents anticipated a large devaluation). This deepened banks’ 
currency mismatch, as banks were unable to adjust the currency denomination of their loans. In 
addition, it worsened flight to quality, as nothing prevented runs on the weakest individual banks. The 
central bank was therefore pressed into providing extensive lending of last resort. Individual bank 
failures happened in any event, thereby reinforcing the panic.  
 
In addition, and most important, the corralito failed to shield the real side of the economy from the 
crisis. It ultimately affected the payments system, as a large part of the transactions were conducted in 
cash, which agents started to hoard and therefore became increasingly scarce. Figure 1 illustrates this 
point, showing the price of liquidity in Argentina 2002, as measured by the cash discount of checks in 
the informal market. This problem was compounded by the fact that, because the corralito allowed 
depositors to shift across currency and deposit type, it defeated the objective of isolating typically 
stable transactional peso deposits from declining dollar saving deposits.  
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internalized and for the “most suitable players” to have a comparative advantage in banking 
intermediation, thereby limiting the vulnerability of the banking system. Finally, if the circuit 
breakers are well designed, they can reduce the cost of a crisis by ensuring that the payment 
system continues to function, banks remain open, and scarce dollar liquidity is allocated to its 
best use. 
 
Governments have been so far reluctant to introduce CBRs during “tranquil” times, as part of 
the “standard” prudential regulatory framework partly out of concern that they could “scare 
away” depositors, thereby reducing the overall level of financial intermediation. However, 
there are some historical precedents for the use of CBRs during the free banking era that 
suggest they were well accepted by the public and ended up serving a useful purpose (see 
Box 4).  
 
Chile provides a more recent illustration of a bank resolution mechanism which is rather 
similar to a CBR and which has been in place since after the 1982 banking crisis (see Box 5).  
Although admittedly aimed at idiosyncratic risk rather than systemic risk, and so far untested, 
this mechanism has not given rise to any substantial concern by banks’ customers. 
 
Indeed, one can also make a parallel between the attitude of emerging markets countries 
about the use of CBRs in the banking system and the adoption of collective action clauses 
(CACs) in sovereign debt markets. Until recently, most countries were reluctant to include 
the CAC in their legal documents because they feared that investors would react negatively 
and would require a higher interest rate on their bonds if they were issued with a clause that 
would make it easier for the country to restructure the debt. However, recent emerging 
market issues including CACs (e.g., Mexico, Brazil, or Uruguay) were not visibly penalized 
by the markets, suggesting that the concerns that countries had about including the clause in 
the bonds may have been largely unjustified.   
 
There are reasons to expect that something similar may occur with the introduction of CBRs.  
On the one hand, if runs are triggered by the anticipation of inevitable bank losses, the 
presence of the CBR should not significantly affect the likelihood of the run. However, if 
liquidity crises are purely self-fulfilling and fueled by the memory of previous bank-run 
episodes, the CBR should be viewed as a desirable mechanism to help prevent banking 
panics and ensure a more stable banking environment—much in the same way as CACs are 
viewed by their advocates as a way of reducing the sunk cost of protracted debt crises.  
 
B.   Which Deposits Should Be Subjected to the CBR? 
 
In considering which deposits should be subjected to the CBR, there are two key questions 
one needs to address: (1) what type and maturity of deposits (transactions, savings, or term 
deposits; short-term or long-term), and (2) which currency? - 18 -   
 
  
Box 4.  CBRs and Suspension of Convertibility in the Free Banking Era 
 
The notion of circuit breakers resembles the suspension of convertibility (an option clause) that 
was included in bank contracts in Scotland and other European countries during the free 
banking era (in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries), and in the United States during the 
national banking period (1863–1914). 
 
The option clause in Europe was introduced at a time when commercial banks issued most of 
the currency and notes in circulation, and when these notes could be redeemed at par for hard 
currency. The clause was designed to allow banks to “defer the redemption of their notes 
provided they pay interest for the period of deferment” (Shah, 1997). In addition in the notes 
there was a printed statement that promised to pay a higher interest rate for the period of 
deferment.   
 
There is little evidence regarding how widely the option clause was used in practice and about 
its effectiveness. Nevertheless, Shah (1997) states that the Bank of Scotland introduced an 
option clause in 1730 in its notes and that it remained in place until 1765, when it was 
outlawed.    
 
The other useful experience was occasions when convertibility of notes was suspended in the 
United States since the Civil War. Calomiris and Gorton (1991) describe seven major episodes 
when there was a suspension of convertibility of notes (1873, 1893, 1907, and 1914) during the 
National Banking Era. The suspension of convertibility was perceived as an effective way to 
deal with bank panics, as it minimized the cost to depositors and avoided a large amount of 
bank failures. Calomiris and Gorton estimate that the worse loss to depositors during the 
National Banking Era was 2.1 cents per dollar of deposits while the worse case in terms of 
banks failing was 1.28 percent during the Panic of 1893 (p. 114). 
 
Dwyer and Hasan (1999) provide additional evidence in favor of using some form of CBR.  
They compare the impact of the 1861 bank panic in Wisconsin and Illinois and find that while 
87 percent of banks in Illinois finally closed, around 44 percent of the banks closed in 
Wisconsin. They argue that the introduction of the suspension of payments in Wisconsin is the 
main reason that explains the better performance of the banks in Wisconsin during the panics.  
In addition, they provide evidence indicating that the suspension of payments decreased 




Let us address the second question first. Should the CBR be limited to dollar deposits, or 
should it be extended to include peso deposits? There are three ways to approach this issue, 
which are, in turn, intimately related to the expected monetary policy reaction to the run. The 
first one clearly differentiates pesos from dollars: in the event of a crisis (if not before), the 
monetary authorities will protect the peso by letting the exchange rate float. The second 
approach is to treat pesos and dollars in exactly the same way: the regulatory framework is 
currency-blind. The third approach is an intermediate one: pesos and dollars are subjected to 
different regulations but the central bank will maintain at all times (through its international 
reserve holdings, monetary policy, and/or peso LOLR) the full convertibility of peso deposits 




Box 5.  A More Recent Example of Pre-Programmed CBR: The Chilean 
“Narrow Bank” Safety Net 
 
Sight deposits (and term deposits of less than 30 days or whose term to maturity is less than 10 
days) are fully guaranteed by the Central Bank of Chile (BCCh), which protects itself from 
potential losses by requiring that banks hold liquid assets (in the form of central bank debt) 
against sight deposits in excess of 2.5 times their capital. In addition, if the guarantee were 
triggered, the BCCh would become the most senior claimant on the bank’s assets.   
 
When a bank is unable to meet its commitments (including as regards its liquid asset 
requirement) or severe solvency or managerial shortfalls emerge (as defined in the banking 
law), the bank’s non-sight liabilities are frozen while sight deposits remain fully accessible; 
they are “decoupled” from the rest of the bank together with the corresponding liquid assets 
plus the BCCh guarantee. This protects the payments system, mitigates the contagion risk of a 
bank closure, and provides breathing room for an efficient resolution of the non-narrow part of 
the bank.  
 
The risk of an unwarranted, last minute expansion of the guarantee is limited by a five-day 
advance notice required by banks for transferring term deposits into sight deposits. The bank 
resolution system is conditioned to (and shaped by) a creditor agreement ratified by the 
majority (in terms of claims) of the bank’s non-sight creditors (and the Superintendency of 
Banks and Financial Institutions). When an agreement cannot be reached, outright liquidation 
on the entire non-narrow bank is the only possible outcome. 
 
 
           Source: Chile FSSA. 
 
 
By clearly signaling the differences between pesos and dollars, the first option (letting the 
exchange rate go) is fully consistent with a medium-term de-dollarization strategy. 
Moreover, it limits the need for foreign reserves. However, as already noted, a large 
exchange rate depreciation (needed to keep the pesos in place) will probably undermine the 
solvency of the banking system in a highly dollarized economy, in turn exacerbating the 
scope for preventive runs and complicating crisis management. Moreover, unless ways can 
be found to protect the solvency of the peso component of banks’ balance sheets (more on 
this below), the dollar will ultimately carry the peso with it into the abyss—in which case 
limiting CBRs to dollars may fail to stabilize peso deposits. 
 
The second option is consistent with a currency board, where the local currency is legally 
convertible to a foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate. Its main drawback, as exemplified 
in the recent Argentine experience, is that it requires very large international reserves. Unless 
this is the case, it may not be credible and may ultimately unravel. If so, currency blindness 
leads to the worst of all worlds in which dollarization is promoted and all hell breaks loose in 
the event of a crisis.  
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The third option is, in principle, viable for highly dollarized countries that do not envisage a 
radical change of monetary regime and do not see de-dollarization as a viable short-term 
goal, but that wish nonetheless to keep all their options open. In such cases, provided the 
CBR ensures that dollar deposits are not converted into peso deposits as a way to siphon off 
scarce dollar reserves (peso deposits could be paid off with peso LOLR liquidity and later 
converted back into actual dollars), the limited size of peso deposits allows them to be 
credibly backed and the exchange rate maintained. The regulatory framework can thus be 
currency-specific. The pesos do not need to be subjected to LARs or CBRs. Instead, the 
central bank can provide the necessary support through conventional means.  
 
As regards the type of deposits subjected to the CBR, the aim should be to maintain access to 
transaction deposits (checking and savings accounts) while restricting access to the most 
liquid savings instruments that can be withdrawn at short notice. A natural choice is to apply 
CBRs only to time deposits, while ensuring the full convertibility of transactional deposits 
(into cash or dollars).
23  
 
Note that this option would call for differentiated LARs on dollar deposits. Banks should 
hold enough liquid assets to back dollar sight deposits, much as in a narrow banking system. 
However, in the case of dollar term deposits, the backing could be reduced and banks would 
rely instead on the CBR to cope with substantial withdrawals.
24 More generally, banks (and 
their clients) could be offered a choice between instruments not subjected to CBRs but with 
high LARs, and instruments subjected to CBRs but benefiting from low LARs.
25 At any rate, 
the substitutability between LARs and CBRs suggests that the two should be determined 
jointly. 
                                                 
23 The main advantage of differentiating between time and sight deposits is that to the extent 
that agents maintain access to their transactional balances, it minimizes the impact on the 
payment system.  While this is not a perfect solution, as some of the time deposits might be a 
temporary store of value of transactional balances, it is probably the best available option at 
the time of a crisis. 
24 Whether the LAR needs to be close to, or exactly equal to, 100 percent of deposits is 
debatable. What is important is that the level should be significantly higher than encountered 
in real life cases. 
25 To promote the development of long maturity instruments, their LARs could be reduced. 
This would require, however, that long maturity instruments be issued in the form of CDs 
that cannot be redeemed ahead of time but can be traded in the stock exchange. Bolivia’s 
experience with over two-year maturity savings instruments is an interesting precedent in this 
regard. - 21 -   
 
 
C.   Who Should “Pull the Trigger” and When? 
 
There are two key policy issues as regards the activation of the CBR: (1) the point at which 
the CBR should be activated, and (2) whether it should be activated centrally (on the basis of 
the overall liquidity of the banking system) or based on bank-specific liquidity indicators.
26  
There are (at least) four possible solutions to the first issue. The first option consists of  
having a purely systemic trigger that sets off when systemic liquidity hits a certain threshold 
and applies to all banks. While it has the advantage that it brings the run to an early halt 
across-the-board, it suffers from two crucial shortcomings. First, it is imposed on banks that 
might not need the CBR, because they have enough liquidity or have access to funding from 
abroad, through their parents or through market arrangements. Thus, a one-size-fits-all 
solution has perverse incentive effects: it penalizes the more conservative local banks that 
manage their liquidity better, and erases the natural competitive advantage in dollarized 
environments of the large, reputable international banks (giving them instead the legal and 
“market” backing—hence the option—to shy away from their losses and leave the country in 
the event of a crisis).
27 Second, it is bound to be questionable on legal grounds, in the 
absence of a verifiable indicator of the systemic nature of the run—defeating one of the key 
goals of the CBR system, namely, the limitation of the fiscal losses associated with a run, 
because of litigation costs that inhibit timely action in the context of a crisis, or burden 
taxpayers once the crisis is behind.  
 
Solution number two sits at the other extreme. It relies on a purely idiosyncratic trigger that 
automatically sets off when any individual bank runs out of liquidity. The main problem with 
this option is that it removes the disciplining benefit on banks’ management and lending 
policies of being exposed to the threat of a run, motivated by concerns from depositors about 
the solvency of the bank.
28 By discouraging depositors from investing in banking systems 
with CBRs and/or raising the cost of funds for such systems, this could make the introduction 
of CBRs politically more difficult. 
 
Solution number three is a middle-of-the-road solution. To become activated, the CBR would 
require both that a bank’s liquidity fall below a certain threshold and that the supervisors 
consent to the activation of the CBR, on the grounds that the underlying cause of the run is 
systemic rather than idiosyncratic. By ensuring that banks do not take advantage of the CBR 
                                                 
26 A related issue is who should be legally responsible for enforcing the CBRs (a thorny 
question given the pressures that supervisory authorities face in the midst of a crisis). 
27 In the case of branches of foreign banks, the legal backing of the branches’ deposits by the 
parent institution is immediately made null and void by a forceful reprogramming of 
deposits. 
28 See Diamond and Rajan (2001). - 22 -   
 
to pursue excessively risky policies, this would limit the scope for moral hazard. This 
solution, however, shares with the first option the drawback that it introduces a scope for 
discretionality in the definition of systemic crises. In particular, supervisors might be 
reluctant to consent to using the CBR on the grounds that doing so might expand the run to 
other banks—as well as triggering risks of litigation. Indeed, once the CBR is activated in 
one bank, risks of contagion and domino effects will rise.
29 Thus, this solution is likely to 
lead to a bias against the activation of the CBR, limiting their usefulness.  
Solution number four is a milder, CBR-like, option that retains the liquidity of transaction 
deposits (based on a Chilean-type deposit insurance) while allowing the rest of the bank to be 
“temporarily closed.” If able to fulfill its prudential requirements, the bank would be 
reopened once the crisis has subsided; it would otherwise be liquidated. During the 
“suspension” period, arrangements would be needed to ensure proper management of the 
bank’s assets. This option would also involve supervisory discretion. However, the 
supervisor’s prompt consent would be more likely here than under option three, as it would 
go in a positive direction (postponing the liquidation of a closed bank, rather than 
restructuring the deposits of an open bank). Indeed, by stressing deposit protection, this 
option could be easier to sell.  
 
As to what should determine the trigger for the CBR, the discussion above clearly favors 
non-discretionary triggers in order to avoid costly delays due to agency problems. On the one 
hand, banks are likely to delay the introduction of the CBR and “gamble for resurrection.” 
However, the longer the decision is postponed the larger the amount of liquid reserves that 
the financial system would lose.
30 As discussed above, leaving the decision to the central 
                                                 
29 The literature on contagion in bank runs suggests that once a specific type of bank has 
failed (cooperative, wholesale, regional, etc), the run quickly spreads to other similar banks. 
To be sure, the triggering of a CBR in a context in which there is “systemic nervousness” is 
likely to quickly lead to a segmentation of the banks into two groups: those that have the 
support (and credibility) to continue doing business as usual, and those that do not. While 
this may look harsh to the banks that are unable to withstand the run, it reflects the risks of 
intermediating in dollars and the comparative advantages of different banks in a dollarized 
environment. By better internalizing risks and ensuring a more efficient competition in the 
market place, this should ultimately benefit the peso (as an independent currency), promote 
the depth of financial intermediation, and increase its resilience. 
30 The bank will evaluate this tradeoff from its own cost-benefit analysis perspective.  If it 
perceives problems in other banks, it will most likely try to protect its own liquidity in order 
to remain stronger in case of a run, and would not internalize any possible negative 
externality on the banking system. If it faces a run it will most likely try to postpone the 
decision to introduce the circuit breakers, in fact doing just the opposite; take a more 
aggressive bet in order to maintain the bank operational, undertake a fire sale of its best and 
most liquid assets, and try to get more assistance from the central bank in order to “gamble 
for resurrection.”   - 23 -   
 
bank is also problematic. In either case, allowing for discretion would enhance the scope for 
ex post battles in the courts—and, for the same reason, ex ante hesitation.  
 
Thus, the CBRs should be automatic and fully determined by market forces, in the form of 
transparent, legally uncontestable criteria. A natural mechanism would entail linking the 
trigger to the failure of the bank to comply with a minimum level of liquidity, so that LARs 
assigned to back non-CBR deposits are not compromised. Consider the case of a CBR on 
dollar time deposits. As the latter leave the bank, or move to sight—or peso—deposits to 
elude the CBR in anticipation of a run, the stock of LARs associated with dollar time 
deposits will start to decline. At the beginning, the bank can cushion part of the decline using 
excess liquidity elsewhere, or borrowing dollars from the market. Ultimately, however, its 
liquidity will fall below the level needed to fully back transaction deposits, and the bank 
would be forced to introduce the CBR.  
 
D.   What Happens the Day After? 
 
The effectiveness of CBRs in stopping (or preventing) runs and restoring confidence in the 
banking system ultimately depends on whether their introduction (before or after the fact) 
creates expectations of forthcoming losses on the restructured deposits. Indeed, if 
expectations of forthcoming losses are widespread, the existence of CBRs  is likely to 
encourage preventive runs. Whether this will be the case largely depends on the broader 
prudential framework and on what happens after the CBRs have been introduced. 
 
Clearly, a well-capitalized banking system (where the risks of dollar loans to non-dollar 
earners have been adequately internalized) will be better able to absorb losses on its dollar 
loans, thereby limiting both potential losses to depositors and the potential adverse impact of 
the CBR. Requiring banks to hold sufficient capital against any shock might be too 
expensive, however. Thus, there might be instances where some losses (or the possibility of 
incurring some losses) are unavoidable. 
 
In this context, some key issues need to be addressed. First, the “rules of the game” that 
define what happens after deposits have been restructured should be well specified and as 
transparent as possible. In particular, the time frame of the restructuring and what happens if 
the bank’s liquidity problems are not resolved within the restructuring period need to be well 
specified. In all cases, there should be a well-defined, efficient banking resolution procedure 
that minimizes the loss in the value of the deposits, should the bank be ultimately unable to 
face its obligations (for reasons of solvency or liquidity).  
 
For dollarized economies, a specific issue that arises in this context is how to limit the scope 
for cross-currency risk contamination and maintain the confidence of the public in the peso 
bank (so as to maintain it open and running) when dollar liabilities have been restructured. 
One option, which is close in spirit to the Chilean scheme, is to give peso depositors an 
official guarantee, backed by preferential claims on the residual value of the bank—which in 
practice amounts to granting seniority to transaction deposits.  
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Another option is to limit the bank’s liability on its dollar losses to its dollar capital, e.g., 
should the dollar bank lose its capital, the capital of the peso bank is not called up to the 
rescue. In the limit, a case can be made for fully “de-coupling” the peso and dollar 
components of the bank’s balance sheet as soon as CBRs are introduced (much as, in the case 
of the Chilean safety net scheme, the transaction-based “narrow bank” is de-coupled from the 
rest of the bank). This would require that the dollar assets that are the counterpart of the 
dollar deposits and the dollar capital that backs these assets be transferred to a separate 
shadow balance sheet (which could eventually be transformed into a trust fund if the bank is 
unable to re-incorporate it within its broader balance sheet), virtually dividing the institution 
into a peso and a dollar bank. This separation would immediately reduce incentives for 
dollarization.
31 The legal underpinnings of this proposal could be complicated, however.
  
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper tackled a question that clearly has important policy implications but has received 
little attention in academic circles: how should scarce dollar systemic liquidity be managed in 
a highly dollarized environment? The paper looked at three interrelated facets of this issue: 
(1) Should liquidity be held or can it be borrowed? (2) When held, should it be centralized or 
decentralized (e.g., held by the central bank or by individual commercial banks)? (3) When 
demands on this liquidity become excessive, should they be stopped in their tracks through 
the use of pre-wired, transparent, circuit breakers?  
 
The previous discussion drew a number of relevant—albeit preliminary—conclusions:   
 
1.  The current menu of liquidity insurance options is mostly limited to forms of self-
insurance (e.g., holding your own liquidity). While market-based (or official) 
insurance has in principle many advantages, getting the right combination of size, 
cost, and guaranteed access seems to be beyond what markets (or IFIs) can presently 
offer. 
 
2.  Given the need for self-insurance, accumulating reserves centrally induces moral 
hazard as banks, particularly weaker ones, free ride on the central bank and hold a 
suboptimally low level of dollar liquidity. In addition to penalizing the more 
conservative banks, centralized reserve holdings end up subsidizing the dollar at the 
expense of the peso. 
 
3.  Decentralized LARs are thus generally preferable. Once introduced, however, the 
central bank may wish to also maintain some international reserves and a dollar 
LOLR capacity to further limit the scope for runs on individual banks. 
 
4.  The optimal level of LAR—and, in particular, the associated cost in terms of reduced 
loanable funds and wider intermediation margins—can be reduced by complementing 
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them with circuit breakers (CBRs), namely, the automatic and early suspension of 
convertibility of (dollar) deposits to prevent exhausting the dollar liquidity and 
compromising the payments system. 
 
5.  To be successful (e.g., to be stabilizing rather than destabilizing), CBRs should be 
accompanied by a sound and transparent prudential and bank resolution framework 
that limits the scope for losses to depositors. 
6.  The introduction of CBRs is likely to be smoother if the emphasis is put on deposit 
protection and efficient bank closures instead of deposit restructurings.  
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A MODEL OF LENDER OF LAST RESORT (LOLR) AND BANK DEMAND FOR DOLLAR 
LIQUIDITY 
 
A.   The Basic Setting 
 
Suppose there are dollar banks offering dollar deposits and investing in dollar loans or dollar 
reserves abroad, and peso banks offering peso deposits and investing in peso loans or peso 
central bank bonds. To begin with, suppose all dollar banks and all peso banks have identical 
assets and risk preferences. 
 
In deciding how much liquidity to hold, dollar banks compare the carrying cost of their 
liquidity to the cost associated with being unable to meet the demand for deposit 
withdrawals. The carrying cost of dollar liquidity equals the spread 
∗ − = D D D r r s  where  D r  is 
the local dollar lending rate, and 
∗
D r  is the world rate of return on liquid dollar assets.  
Similarly for peso banks, the carrying cost of liquidity is the spread 
∗ − = P P P r r s  where  P r  is 
the peso lending rate and 
∗
P r  is the yield of central bank peso bonds. Assuming interest rate 
parity,  , P D r r =  and a positive country and currency premium,  0 > − =
∗ ∗
D P r r ϕ , it follows 
that: . ϕ = − = −
∗ ∗
D P P D r r s s   
 
Let  ) (x P  be the cumulative probability of facing a systemic deposit run (uniform over all 
banks and currencies) of up to size x, where  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  is the proportion of the bank's 
deposits.  ) (x P  is assumed to be monotonically increasing and convex over the range  ] 1 , 0 [ , 
so that  0 ) ( < ′ ′ x P  over the range (runs of size x become less and less likely as x increases). 
For simplicity, we assume  ) (x P  exogenous and identical for peso and dollar banks. The cost 
of falling short of liquidity is the loss of value resulting from the firesale of loans, which is 
defined (per value of loan) as , µ  and is assumed to be the same for peso and dollar loans. 
 
B.   The Case of No LOLR 
 
In the absence of a LOLR, banks hold liquid reserves, l, such that they can meet deposit 
withdrawals up to the point where the carrying cost of a marginal unit of reserves equals the 
expected benefit of being able to meet the marginal demand for deposits (thereby avoiding 
the marginal cost of fire sales). Thus: 
D P i l P s i i ,   ), ( = ′ = µ                         (1) 
or: 
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u P .  
 
C.   The Case with LOLR 
 
To ensure that the LOLR is only used as a last resort, its rate must be a penalty rate 
, i i i r R σ + =  where  , 0 > i σ   . ,D P i =  At the same time, for the facility to be used:  µ < i R . If 
access to LOLR is unlimited (i.e., as long as the stock of official reserves is not binding), 
banks will limit their demand for liquidity such that the carrying cost of the marginal reserve 
equals the expected cost of accessing the LOLR facility: 
 
() i ii s RP l ′ =
)
                                                   (3) 
 










                                               (4) 
 
Since  µ < i R , banks' demand for liquid reserves is now lower ( i i ll <
)
) and declines as  i R   
increases. Provided the cost of using the LOLR facility is sufficiently high,  ), 0 ( / P s R i i ′ >  it 
pays for banks to keep a minimum cushion of reserves to accommodate deposit withdrawals 
within a limited range where runs are more likely. For larger, less likely runs, banks are 
better off counting on the central bank to bail them out. 
 
In the case of a dollar LOLR, the carrying cost of reserves should equal  D s , as before. Yet, 
the expected revenues from holding a marginal unit of official reserves are  ) (x P RD ′  for  
[, ] DD x ll N ∈+
) )
 . From (3), it is clear that:  ) (x P R s D D ′ >  in that range. Thus, the central bank 
will be making losses.  
 
D.   Differentiated Banks 
 
Suppose there are two types of dollar banks. Aggressive banks invest in riskier projects and 
face a positive probability of becoming insolvent at some time before the deposit run. If p is 
the probability that the bank will still be solvent at the time of the run,
32  1 α <  is the fraction 
of the spread associated with the cost of carrying the reserves during the time the bank 
remains solvent, and 
a
D s  and 
c
D s  are the spreads faced by aggressive banks and conservative 




D s  reflecting higher risk, the demand for liquidity by aggressive banks may 
be expressed as: 
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D ) ( )] 1 ( [ ′ = − +α  
or: 
) (
) 1 ( a
D D
a










D s s >




D l l <  i.e., aggressive banks hold fewer reserves than conservative 
banks. Hence, they will make a disproportionate use of the LOLR facility. In turn, if central 
bank reserves are limited and rationed among all banks, conservative banks will increase 
their reserve holdings to avoid being rationed. Thus, for  [,] ,
a c
D D x ll ∈
)
the central bank's 




 - 29 - 
 
REFERENCES 
Broda, C., and E. Levy Yeyati, 2003a, “Dollarization and the Lender of Last Resort,” in 
Dollarization: Debates and Policy Alternatives, ed. by E. Levy Yeyati and 
F. Sturzenegger (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
 
________, 2003b, “Endogenous Deposit Dollarization,” Staff Report 160 (New York:  
Federal Reserve Bank of New York), also forthcoming in Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking. 
 
Calvo, G., 1988, “Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations,” American Economic 
Review, Vol. 78, pp. 647–61. 
 
Cole, H., and T. Kehoe, 1996, “A Self-fulfilling Model of Mexico’s 1994–1995 Debt Crisis,” 
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 309–30. 
 
Caballero, R., S. Panageas, 2004, “Contingent Reserves Management: An Applied 
Framework,” NBER Working Paper No. 10786 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National 
Bureau of Economic Research). 
 
Calomiris, C., and G. Gorton, 1991, “The Origin of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank 
 Regulation,”  in  Financial Markets and Financial Crisis, ed. by Glenn Hubbard  
  (Chicago: The Chicago University Press), pp. 109–73. 
 
Chang, R., and A. Velasco, 1998, “Financial Crises in Emerging Markets,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 6606 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic 
Research). 
 
Cordella, T., and E. Levy Yeyati, 2005, “A (New) Country Insurance Facility,” IMF 
Working Paper No. 05/23 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
 
Cowan, T., and R. Kroszner, 1989, “Scottish Free Banking before 1845: A Model for 
Laissez-Faire?” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May). 
 
Diamond, D., and P. Dybvig, 1983, “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,” Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 401–19. 
 
________, and R. Rajan, 2001, “Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: 
A Theory of Banking,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, No. 2, pp. 287–327. 
 
Dwyer, G., and I. Hasan, 1999, “Suspension of Payments, Bank Failures and the Nonbank 
  Public’s Losses,” unpublished. 
 
Freixas, X., B. Parigi, and J.C. Rochet, 2003, “The Lender of Last Resort: A 21
st Century 
Approach,” ECB Working Paper 298 (Frankfurt: European Central Bank). - 30 -   
 
 
Golfajn, I. and R. Valdés, 1997, “Balance of Payments Crises and Capital Flows: The Role of 
Liquidity,” Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 11 (Santiago).  
 
Gulde, A.M., D. Hoelscher, A. Ize, D. Marston, and G. De Nicoló, 2004, “Financial Stability 
in Dollarized Economies,” IMF Occasional Paper 230 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund). 
 
Ingves, S., and M. Moretti, 2003, “Banking Failures in Countries Dependent on a Foreign 
Currency,” Paper presented at the workshop on “Individual Failures of Large Banks: 
How To Avoid Systemic Crises?” Buenos Aires, unpublished. 
 
Ize, A., 2005, “Capitalizing Central Banks: A Net Worth Approach,” forthcoming in Staff 
Papers, International Monetary Fund. 
 
________, and G. Ortiz, 1987, “Fiscal Rigidities, Public Debt, and Capital Flight,” Staff 
Papers, International Monetary Fund, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 311–32. 
 
Kaminski, G., and C. Reinhart, 1999, “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and 
Balance-of-Payments Problems,” American Economic Review, Vol. 3, pp. 473–500. 
 
Levy Yeyati, E. , S. Martínez Pería, and S. Schmukler, 2004, “Market Discipline in 
Emerging Economies: Beyond Bank Fundamentals,” in Market Discipline across 
Countries and Industries, ed. by W. Hunter, G. Kaufman, C. Borio, and 
K. Tsatsaronis, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
 
Shah, P., 1997, “The Option Clause in Free-Banking, Theory and Practice: A Reappraisal,” 
  Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 1–25. 
 
Zettelmeyer, J., 2000, “Can Official Crisis Lending be Counterproductive in the Short Run?” 
  Economic Notes, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 13–29.  
 